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Abstract
When ambiguity averse investors process news of uncertain quality, they act as if
they take a worst-case assessment of quality. As a result, they react more strongly
to bad news than to good news. They also dislike assets for which information
quality is poor, especially when the underlying fundamentals are volatile. These
eﬀects induce negative skewness in asset returns, increase price volatility and induce
ambiguity premia that depend on idiosyncratic risk in fundamentals. Moreover,
shocks to information quality can have persistent negative eﬀects on prices even
if fundamentals do not change. This helps to explain the reaction of markets to
events like 9/11/2001.
1I N T R O D U C T I O N
When an individual makes decisions under uncertainty, he may receive information, or
signals, about unknown parameters. Most economic models assume that signals are
processed in the Bayesian way: the individual forms subjective probabilistic beliefs about
the parameters; then he incorporates signal realizations into beliefs by applying Bayes’
Rule, given a likelihood function that relates signals to parameters. The Ellsberg Para-
dox highlights one limitation of the Bayesian model: it cannot accommodate ambiguity,
where the individual is not conﬁdent enough in his prior understanding of the environ-
ment to commit to a single (subjective) probability measure. This paper is concerned
with a second feature of complicated environments that is also beyond the scope of the
Bayesian approach - it is often diﬃcult to know the reliability of signals. We incorporate
ambiguous information into a choice-theoretic framework. We then derive its implications
for behavior and study its role in ﬁnancial markets.
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1Our model of information is illustrated most easily with an example. Let θ denote
a parameter that the agent wants to learn. We assume that a signal s is related to the
parameter by a family of likelihoods:

















Bayesian models focus on the special case of a single likelihood, σ2
s = σ2
s, and measure
the quality of informationp r o v i d e db yt h es i g n a ls via the precision 1/σ2
ε.I no u rm o d e l ,
information quality is captured by the range of precisions [1/σ2
s,1/σ2
s].I n f o r m a t i o n
quality therefore has two dimensions: the overall location of the interval determines how
quickly an agent expects uncertainty to be resolved, while its width measures (lack of)
conﬁdence in the reliability of the signal. The latter dimension is unique to the case
of ambiguity. In this paper, we argue that to capture the eﬀects of an improvement in
information quality, it is important to distinguish these two dimensions: the economic
consequences of a rightward shift in the interval of precisions diﬀer qualitatively from
those of a reduction in the interval width.
To model preferences (as opposed to merely beliefs), we use recursive multiple-priors
utility, axiomatized in Epstein and Schneider [17]. The axioms describe behavior that
is consistent with experimental evidence typiﬁed by the Ellsberg Paradox. They imply
that an ambiguity averse agent behaves as if he maximizes, every period, expected utility
under a worst-case belief that is chosen from a set of conditional probabilities. In the
present paper, the set of conditional probabilities incorporates ambiguous information.
These probabilities are updated by applying Bayes’ Rule to the whole family of likelihoods
that describe a signal. Through updating, ambiguity in signals aﬀects the set from which
worst-case conditionals can be drawn, and hence behavior.
Ambiguous information has two key eﬀects on behavior. First, after as i g n a lh a s
arrived, agents respond asymmetrically: bad news aﬀect conditional actions — such as
portfolio decisions — more than good news. This is because agents evaluate any action
using the conditional probability that minimizes the utility of that action. If an am-
biguous signal conveys good (bad) news, the worst case is that the signal is unreliable
(very reliable). Second, even before an ambiguous signal arrives, agents who anticipate
the arrival of low quality information will discount consumption plans for which this
information may be relevant.
F i n a n c i a lm a r k e tp a r t i c i p a n t sa b s o r bal a r g ea m o u n to fn e w se v e r yd a y .T oi l l u s t r a t e
the role of ambiguous information in ﬁnancial markets, we consider a representative agent
asset pricing model. The agent’s information consists of (i) past prices and dividends
and (ii) an additional, ambiguous, signal that is informative about future dividends. Our
setup thus distinguishes between tangible information — here dividends, and also past
prices — that lends itself to econometric analysis, and intangible information — such as
news reports — that is hard to quantify, yet important for market participants’ decisions.
We assume that intangible information is ambiguous while tangible information is not.
We derive some general properties of prices and clarify the relationship between prices and
information quality under ambiguity. Then we explore the response to sudden changes in
information quality by calibrating a model to the aftermath of 9/11. This also illustrates
2how belief parameters can be identiﬁed from observed prices.
Reaction to ambiguous news aﬀects the ﬁrst three moments of asset prices. First,
the anticipation of ambiguous information increases measured average excess returns.
As with consumption plans, agents dislike assets about which ambiguous information is
expected to arrive. They are willing to buy such assets only at a discount, so that a
premium for low information quality emerges in equilibrium. Second, the volatility of
prices and returns can be much larger than the volatility of fundamentals. Volatility
depends on how much the worst-case conditional expectation of fundamentals ﬂuctuates.
If the range of precisions contemplated by ambiguity averse agents is large, they will
often attach more weight to a signal than agents who know the true precision. Intangible
information can thus cause large price ﬂuctuations.
Third, the asymmetric response to ambiguous information implies that returns should
be negatively skewed at high frequencies. Negative skewness here is not derived from
asymmetries in the distribution of signals or fundamentals — it is simply due to agents’
processing of signals under ambiguity. The model also suggests that skewness should be
more pronounced for stocks for which the relevant amount of intangible information is
larger. This is consistent with the fact that stocks that are “in the news” more — such
as glamour stocks, stocks that have recently experienced a runup in prices, and stocks of
large ﬁrms — exhibit more negative skewness.
Premia due to ambiguous information are distinct from risk premia. Under ambiguity,
an asset can command a high premium even if it is uncorrelated with all other assets
in the market and makes up a small share of the representative agent’s portfolio. For
ambiguity averse investors, uncertainty is a ﬁrst-order concern: if information quality
drops, an asset is treated as if its mean payoﬀ has fallen. This lowers prices (and increases
expected excess returns) regardless of covariance with the market. In addition, premia
due to ambiguous information depend not only on the quality of information about that
asset, but also on the volatility of its fundamentals. In markets where fundamentals do
not move much, it is irrelevant whether information quality is high or low. In contrast,
when fundamentals are volatile, information quality is much more of a concern and the
premium for low quality is higher. Importantly, ambiguity averse investors fear not only
market-wide, but also asset-speciﬁc ambiguous information. The model thus predicts the
existence of a premium for idiosyncratic volatility.
Moreover, ambiguity premia are anticipatory: the prospect of lower information qual-
ity, perhaps triggered by an announcement or other event, is suﬃcient to lower asset
prices. In contrast, in a Bayesian model changes in future information quality are ir-
relevant for current prices. This result suggests that conclusions commonly drawn from
event studies should be interpreted with caution. For example, a negative abnormal re-
turn after a merger announcement need not imply that the market views the merger as
a bad idea. Instead it might simply reﬂect the market’s discomfort in the face of the
upcoming period of ambiguous information. Importantly, a discount due to low future
idiosyncratic information quality cannot be captured by the Bayesian model: if lower
information quality is captured by higher risk, then it should be diversiﬁed away.
3The importance of ambiguous news varies not only in the cross-section, but also over
time. Ambiguous information is particularly prevalent when payoﬀ-relevant news are
unfamiliar to market participants. This leads us to consider shocks to information quality.
Asset markets often witness events that simultaneously (i) increase uncertainty about
fundamentals and (ii) change the nature of signals relevant for forecasting fundamentals.
One example is the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. This shock both increased
uncertainty about future growth and shifted the focus to hitherto “unfamiliar” news
about foreign policy and terrorism. Since the shock increased uncertainty, it marked the
start of a learning process that aﬀected prices. Since the news were unfamiliar, it is
natural to model this process as learning from ambiguous signals.
Shocks to information quality can have drawn out negative eﬀects on prices even if
fundamentals do not change. The initial drop in the stock market when it reopened on
September 17 was followed by more losses over the following week, before a gradual re-
bound occurred. With hindsight, we know that no long term structural change occurred:
the shock changed only information quality, not fundamentals. Thus a Bayesian model
with known signal quality has problems explaining the initial slide in prices. Roughly,
if signal precision is high, the arrival of enough bad news to explain the ﬁrst week is
highly unlikely. If signal precision is low, bad news will not be incorporated into prices
in the ﬁrst place. In our model, where signal precision is unknown, bad news are taken
especially seriously and hence a much less extreme sequence of signals suﬃces to account
for prices in the ﬁrst week. In sum, ambiguous information can help to rationalize the
delayed negative response observed after a shock to information quality.
Our assumption that tangible information is unambiguous is a simpliﬁcation. More
generally, one would expect that all information is at least somewhat ambiguous. How-
ever, it is plausible that intangible information is more ambiguous than tangible infor-
mation. Econometric analysis can often help to narrow down the range of precisions for
tangible signals: for example, one can study the predictability of stock returns by the
price/dividend ratio. As discussed in Epstein and Schneider [19], learning can resolve
ambiguity over time, so that one might expect a narrower range of precisions for tangible
signals. In contrast, quantitative analysis that determines the true precision of news
reports is almost impossible.
With ambiguous signals, the relationship between information quality and the volatil-
i t yo fp r i c e sa n dr e t u r n si sv e r yd i ﬀerent from that with risky (or noisy) signals. With
noisy signals, better information quality (that is, higher precision) simply means that
information about future cash ﬂows is revealed earlier, at which time the cash ﬂows are
discounted more heavily. As a result, changes in information quality aﬀect the volatil-
ity of prices and returns in opposite directions. For example, with earlier release of
information, prices ﬂuctuate more but returns ﬂuctuate less. In our framework, higher
information quality can also mean that news becomes less ambiguous or easier to inter-
pret. Rather than speed up the temporal resolution of uncertainty, this changes how
shocks to fundamentals feed through to prices and returns at a point in time via the in-
terpretation of signals. Changes in information quality then aﬀect the volatility of prices
and returns in the same direction. For example, a reduction of ambiguity — perhaps due
4to improvements in information technology — can increase the volatility of both prices
and returns.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple thought experiment —
related to the Ellsberg Paradox — in order to clarify the concept of ambiguous information
and our modeling approach. It also reviews recursive multiple-priors utility. Section
3 discusses a simple representative agent model and derives general properties. Here
we also contrast the Bayesian and ambiguity aversion approaches to thinking about
information quality and asset pricing. Section 4 considers the calibrated model of 9/11
as an example of shocks to information quality. Section 5 discusses related literature.
Proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 AMBIGUOUS INFORMATION
In this section, we discuss two experiments that illustrate how ambiguity aversion can
imply behavior that is both intuitive and inconsistent with the standard expected utility
model. The ﬁrst is the classic Ellsberg Paradox thatw a st h es t a r t i n gp o i n tf o rt h el a r g e
experimental literature on ambiguity. A second (thought) experiment clariﬁes the concept
of ambiguous information. We then discuss an example with normal distributions, already
partly described in the introduction, that is the key tool for our applications. Finally, we
discuss the axiomatic underpinnings of our approach as well as its connection to the more
general model of learning under ambiguity introduced in Epstein and Schneider [19].
2.1 Experiments
Experiment 1 (Ellsberg Paradox). Consider two urns, each containing four balls that are
either black or white. The agent is told that the ﬁrst “risky” urn contains two balls of
each color. For the second “ambiguous” urn, he is told only that it contains at least one
ball of each color. It is announced that one ball will be drawn from each urn. The agent
is invited to bet on their color. Any bet (on a ball of some color drawn from some urn)
pays one dollar (or one util) if the ball has the desired color and zero otherwise.
Intuitive behavior pointed to by Ellsberg, and subsequently documented in many
experiments, is the preference to bet on drawing black from the risky urn as opposed
to the ambiguous one, and a similar preference for white. The paradox is that decision-
makers who form a single subjective probability over the composition of the ambiguous
urn cannot exhibit such behavior. Indeed, strict preference for black from the risky urn
reveals that the subjective probability of black for the ambiguous urn is less than 1
2
(that is, the objective probability of black for the risky urn). At the same time, strict
preference for white from the risky urn reveals that the subjective probability of black for
the ambiguous urn is more than 1
2, a contradiction. An alternative way to think about
Ellsberg-type behavior is that a decision-maker forms a (subjective) range of probabilities
about the composition of the ambiguous urn. He then evaluates bets by calculating the





. The worst-case expected utility of a bet on black is then p for a bet
on black, and 1 − ¯ p for a bet on white. Since the objective probability of black from the
risky urn is 1
2, Ellsberg-type behavior follows whenever p < 1
2 < ¯ p.
To emphasize the relevance for asset pricing, it is helpful to view the Ellsberg Paradox
as a simple portfolio choice problem under model uncertainty. Bets on black and white
from the ambiguous urn are assets. The correct “model” of their payoﬀsi sn o tk n o w n .A
Bayesian investor treats all model uncertainty as risk — he decides on a prior over possible
distributions and uses that prior to calculate conditional payoﬀs. Since information
about the assets is symmetric here, a typical Bayesian would probably adopt a prior that
respects symmetry. But this implies that under his conditional belief each asset pays one
with probability one half, and zero otherwise, whatever the precise shape of the prior.
As a result, the Bayesian would be indiﬀerent between either bet on the ambiguous urn
and a bet on the fair risky urn. The behavior pointed to by Ellsberg shows that people
do not treat model uncertainty simply as risk. Instead, they behave as if they adjust the
mean return on the ambiguous assets. This ﬁrst order eﬀect of model uncertainty will
be an important theme below.
In sum, the Ellsberg Paradox arises because decision makers appear to feel more
comfortable when the probabilities of uncertain events are objectively known. Gilboa
and Schmeidler [22] have shown formally that this attitude can be captured by multiple
priors. If S is a set of possible states of the world and c : S → R is a consumption plan,
they deﬁne utility by




where u is a standard utility function, P is a set of probability measures on S, and Ep is
the expectation under p ∈ P. The model coincides with the expected utility model when
beliefs are given by a single probability, that is, P ={p}. More generally, the decision-
maker behaves as if he evaluates the utility of a plan c under the “worst-case” probability
in P. Gilboa and Schmeidler prove that this is implied by “preference for objectively
known probabilities”, as described by their axioms.
Ambiguous Information
Experiment 2. Consider again a risky and an ambiguous urn. Instead of betting on
the next draw, the agent is now invited to bet on the colors of two speciﬁc balls, called
the “coin balls”. For each urn, the color of the coin ball is determined by ﬂi p p i n gaf a i r
coin: it is black if the coin toss produces heads and white otherwise, where the coin tosses
are independent across urns. In addition to the coin ball, each urn contains n “non-coin
balls”, of which exactly n
2 are black and n
2 are white. For the risky urn, it is known
that n =4 : there are exactly two black and two white non-coin balls. In contrast, the
number of non-coin balls in the ambiguous urn is unknown — there could be either n =2
(one white and one black) or n =6(three white and three black) non-coin balls. The
possibilities are illustrated in Figure 1.
6Figure 1: Risky and ambiguous urns for Experiment 2. The coin balls are drawn as half
black. The ambiguous urn contains either n =2or n =6non-coin balls.
Ap r i o r i , before any draw is observed, one should be indiﬀerent between bets on the
coin ball from either urn - all these bets amount to betting on a fair coin. Suppose now
that one draw from each urn is observed and that both balls drawn are black. For the
risky urn, it is straightforward to calculate the conditional probability of a black coin
ball. Let n denote the number of non-coin balls. Since the unconditional probability of
a black coin ball is equal to that of a black draw (both are equal to 1
2),w eh a v e




and with n =4for the risky urn, the result is 3
5.
The draw from the ambiguous urn is also informative about the coin ball, but there
is a diﬀerence between the information provided about the two urns. In particular, it is
intuitive that one would prefer to bet on a black coin ball in the risky urn rather than in
the ambiguous urn. The reasoning here could be something like “if I see a black ball from
the risky urn, I know that the probability of the coin ball being black is exactly 3
5.O nt h e
other hand, I’m not sure how to interpret the draw of a black ball from the ambiguous
urn. It would be a strong indicator of a black coin ball if n =2 , but it could also be a
much weaker indicator, since there might be n =6non-coin balls. Thus the posterior
probability of the coin ball being black could be anywhere between
6/2+1
6+1 = 4
7 ≈ .57 and
2/2+1
2+1 = 2
3. So I’d rather bet on the risky urn.” By similar reasoning, it is intuitive that
o n ew o u l dp r e f e rt ob e to naw h i t ec o i nb a l li nt h er i s k yu r nr a t h e rt h a ni nt h ea m b i g u o u s
urn. One might say “I know that the probability of the coin ball being white is exactly
2
5. However, the posterior probability of the coin ball being white could be anywhere
between 1
3 and 3
7 ≈ .43. Again I’d rather bet on the risky urn.”
Could a Bayesian agent exhibit these choices? In principle, it is possible to construct
a subjective probability belief about the composition of the ambiguous urn to rationalize
the choices. However, any such belief must imply that the number of non-coin balls in
7the ambiguous urn depend on the color of the coin ball, contradicting the description
of the experiment. To see this, assume independence and let p denote the subjective




7 (1 − p).
Strict preference for a bet on a black coin ball in the risky urn requires that this pos-
terior probability be greater than 3
5 and thus reveals that p> 3
10. At the same time,
strict preference for a bet on a white coin ball in the risky urn reveals that p< 3
10, a
contradiction.
This limitation of the Bayesian model is similar to that exhibited in the Ellsberg
Paradox above. However, the key diﬀerence is that the Ellsberg Paradox arises in a
static context, while here ambiguity is only relevant ex post, after the signal has been
observed.
Information Quality and Multiple Likelihoods
T h ep r e f e r e n c et ob e to nt h er i s k yu r ni si n t u i t i v eb e c a u s et h ea m b i g u o u ss i g n a l—t h e
draw from the ambiguous urn — appears to be of lower quality than the noisy signal —
the draw from the risky urn. A perception of low information quality arises because the
distribution of the ambiguous signal is not objectively given. As a result, the standard
Bayesian measure of information quality, precision, is not suﬃcient to adequately compare
the two signals. The precision of the noisy signal is parametrized by the number of non-
coin balls n: when there are few non-coin balls that add noise, precision is high. We
have shown that a single number for precision (or, more generally, a single prior over n)
cannot rationalize the intuitive choices. Instead, behavior is as if one is using diﬀerent
precisions depending on the bet that is evaluated.
Indeed, in the case of bets on a black coin ball, the choice is made as if the ambiguous
signal is less precise than the noisy one, so that the available evidence of a black draw
is a weaker indicator of a black coin ball. In other words, when the new evidence — the
drawn black ball — is “good news” for the bet to be evaluated, the signal is viewed as
relatively imprecise. In contrast, in the case of bets on white, the choice is made as if
the ambiguous signal is more precise then the noisy one, so that the black draw is a
stronger indicator of a black coin ball. Now the new evidence is “bad news” for the bet
to be evaluated and is viewed as relatively precise. The intuitive choices can thus be
traced to an asymmetric response to ambiguous news. In our model, this is captured
by combining worst-case evaluation as in Gilboa-Schmeidler with the description of an
ambiguous signal by multiple likelihoods.
More formally, we can think of the decision-maker as trying to learn the colors of
the two coin balls. His prior is the same for both urns and simply places probability
1
2 on black. The draw from the risky urn is a noisy signal of the color of the coin ball.
Its (objectively known) distribution is that black is drawn with probability 3
5 if the coin
ball is black, and 2
5 if the coin ball is white. However, for the ambiguous urn, the signal
distribution is unknown. If n =2or 6 is the unknown number of non-coin balls, then
black is drawn with probability
n/2+1
n+1 if the coin ball is black and
n/2
5n+1 if it is white.
8Consider now updating about the ambiguous urn conditional on observing a black draw.
Bayes’ Rule applied in turn to the two possibilities for n gives rise to the posterior
probabilities for a black coin ball of 4
7 and 2







.1 If bets on the ambiguous urn are again evaluated under
worst-case probabilities, then the expected payoﬀ on a bet on a black coin ball in the
ambiguous urn is 4
7, strictly less than 3
5,t h ep a y o ﬀ from the corresponding bet on the
risky urn. At the same time, the expected payoﬀ on a bet on a black coin ball in the
ambiguous urn is 1
3, strictly less than the risky urn payoﬀ of 2
5.
Normal Distributions
To write down tractable models with ambiguous signals, it is convenient to use normal
distributions. The following example features a normal ambiguous signal that inherits
all the key features of the ambiguous urn from Experiment 2. This example is at the
heart of our asset pricing applications below. Let θ denote a parameter that the agent
wants to learn about. This might be some aspect of future asset payoﬀs. Assume that
the agent has a unique normal prior over θ,t h a ti sθ ∼ N (m,σ2
θ) — there is no ambiguity
ex ante. Assume further that an ambiguous signal s is described by the set of likelihoods
(1) from the introduction. For comparison with Experiment 2, the parameter θ here is
analogous to the color of the coin ball, while the variance σ2
s of the mean-zero shock ε
plays the same role as the number of non-coin balls in the ambiguous urn.





























Even though there is a unique prior over θ, updating leads to a nondegenerate set of
posteriors — the signal induces ambiguity about the parameter. Suppose further that in
each period, choice is determined by maximization of expected utility under the worst-
case belief chosen from the family of posteriors. Now it is easy to see that, after a
signal has arrived, the agent responds asymmetrically. For example, when evaluating a
bet, or asset, that depends positively on θ, he will use a posterior that has a low mean.
Therefore, if the news about θ is good (s>m ),h ew i l la c ta si ft h es i g n a li si m p r e c i s e
(σ2
s high), while if the news is bad (s<m ), he will view the signal as reliable (σ2
s low).
As a result, bad news aﬀect conditional actions more than good news.
2.2 A Model of Learning under Ambiguity
Recursive multiple-priors utility, axiomatized by Epstein and Schneider [17], extends the
Gilboa-Schmeidler model to an intertemporal setting. Suppose that S is a ﬁnite period
state space. One element st ∈ S is observed every period. At time t, the decision-maker’s
1Because the agent maximizes expected utility under the worst-case probability, his behavior is iden-
tical if he uses the entire interval of posterior probabilities or if he uses only its endpoints.
9information consists of the history st =( s1,...,st). Consumption plans are sequences
c =( ct),w h e r ee a c hct depends on the history st. Given a history, preferences over future
consumption are represented by a conditional utility function Ut,d e ﬁned recursively by
Ut(c;s








where β and u satisfy the usual properties. The set Pt(st) of probability measures on S
captures conditional beliefs about the next observation st+1. Thus beliefs are determined
by the whole process of conditional one-step-ahead belief sets {Pt(st)}.
To clarify the connection to the atemporal case (2), it is helpful to rewrite utility
using discounted sums. Consider the collection of all sets Pt(st),a so n ev a r i e so v e rt i m e s
and histories. This collection determines a unique set of probability measures P on S∞
satisfying the regularity conditions speciﬁed in [17].2 Thus one obtains the following







s−t u(cs) | s
t ¤
.
This expression shows that each conditional ordering conforms to the multiple-priors
model in Gilboa and Schmeidler [22], with the set of priors for time t determined by
updating the set P measure-by-measure via Bayes’ Rule.
Epstein and Schneider [19] propose a particular functional form for {Pt(st)} in order
to capture learning from a sequence of conditionally independent signals. Let Θ denote
a parameter space that represents features of the data that the decision maker tries to
learn. Denote by M0 a set of probability measures on Θ that represents initial beliefs
about the parameters, perhaps based on prior information. Taking M0 to be a set allows
the decision-maker to view this initial information as ambiguous. The distribution of the
signal st conditional on a parameter value θ is described by a set of likelihoods L.E v e r y
parameter value θ ∈ Θ is thus associated with a set of probability measures L(·|θ). The
size of this set reﬂects the decision maker’s (lack of) conﬁdence in what an ambiguous
signal means, given that the parameter is equal to θ. Signals are unambiguous only if
there is a single likelihood, that is L = { }. Otherwise, the decision-maker feels unsure
about how parameters are reﬂected in data. The set of normal likelihoods described in
(1) is a tractable example of this that will be important below.
Beliefs about every signal in the sequence {st} are described by the same set L.
Moreover, for a given parameter value θ ∈ Θ, the signals are known to be independent
over time. However, the decision-maker is not conﬁdent that the data are actually iden-
tically distributed over time. In contrast, he believes that any sequence of likelihoods
 t =(  1,.., t) ∈ Lt could have generated a given sample st and any likelihood in L might
underlie the next observation. The set L represents factors that the agent perceives as
being relevant but which he understands only poorly - they can vary across time in a way
2In the inﬁnite horizon case, uniqueness obtains only if P is assumed also to be regular in a sense
deﬁned in Epstein and Schneider [18], generalizing to sets of priors the standard notion of regularity for
a single prior.
10that he does not understand beyond the limitation imposed by L. Accordingly, he has
decided that he will not try to (or is not able to) learn about these factors. In contrast,
because θ is ﬁxed over time, he can try to learn the true θ.
Conditional independence implies that the sample st aﬀects beliefs about future sig-
nals (such as st+1) o n l yt ot h ee x t e n tt h a ti ta ﬀects beliefs about the parameter. We
can therefore construct beliefs {Pt(st)} in two steps. First, we deﬁne a set of posterior
beliefs over the parameter. For any history st,p r i o rµ0 ∈ M0 and sequence of likelihoods
 t ∈ Lt,l e tµt (· ;st.µ0,  t) denote the posterior obtained by updating µ0 by Bayes Rule if
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Θ  t(st | θ
0)dµt−1(θ




The set of posteriors Mt (st) now contains all posteriors that can be derived by varying













Second, we obtain one-step-ahead beliefs by integrating out the parameter. This is
analogous to the Bayesian case. Indeed, if there were a single posterior µt and likelihood

















 t+1(·|θ)dµt(θ):µt ∈ Mt(s






This is the process of one-step-ahead beliefs that enters the speciﬁcation of recursive
multiple priors preferences (3).
The Bayesian model of learning from conditionally i.i.d. signals obtains as the special
case of (5) when both the prior and likelihood sets have only a single element. For that
model, the de Finetti theorem implies that one-step-ahead beliefs can be written equiva-
lently as the conditionals of a single exchangeable probability P∗ on the set of sequences
S∞. Similarly, when there is a single likelihood, that is, signals are unambiguous, then
there is a set P∗ of exchangeable measures on S∞, such that Pt(st) equals the set of all
one-step-ahead conditionals induced by measures in P∗.
113 TREE PRICING
In this section, we derive two key properties of asset pricing with ambiguous news: market
participants respond more strongly to bad news than to good news, and returns must
compensate market participants for enduring periods of ambiguous news. We derive
these properties ﬁrst in a simple three-period setting. In this context, we also compare
the properties of information quality in our model to those of Bayesian models. We then
move to an inﬁnite horizon setting, where we derive a number of implications for observed
moments.
3 . 1 A nA s s e tM a r k e tw i t hA m b i g u o u sN e w s
There are three dates, labelled 0, 1 and 2. We focus on news about one particular asset
(asset A). There are 1
n shares of this asset outstanding, where each share is a claim to a
dividend
d = m + ε
a + ε
i.
Here m is the mean dividend, εa is an aggregate shock and εi is an idiosyncratic shock that
aﬀects only asset A. In what follows, all shocks are mutually independent and normally
distributed with mean zero. We summarize the payoﬀ on all other assets by a dividend
˜ d =˜ m + εa +˜ εi, where ˜ m is the mean dividend and ˜ εi is a shock. There are n−1
n shares




˜ d. In the special case n =1 , asset A is itself the market. For n large, it can be
interpreted as stock in a single small company.
News
Dividends are revealed at date 2. The arrival of news about asset A at date 1 is repre-





Here the number α ≥ 0 measures how speciﬁc the signal is to the particular asset on
which we focus. For example, suppose n is large, and hence that d represents future
dividends of a small company. If α =1 ,t h e nt h es i g n a ls is simply a noisy estimate
of future cash ﬂow d. As such, it partly reﬂects future aggregate economic conditions
εa. In contrast, if α =0 , then the news is 100% company-speciﬁc: while it helps to
forecast company cash ﬂow d, the signal is not useful for forecasting the payoﬀ on other
assets (that is, ˜ d). Examples of company-speciﬁcn e w si n c l u d ec h a n g e si nm a n a g e m e n t
or merger announcements.
We assume that the signal is ambiguous: the variance of the shock εs is known only
to lie in some range, σ2
s ∈ [σ2
s,σ2
s]. T h i sc a p t u r e st h ea g e n t ’ sl a c ko fc o n ﬁdence in the
signal’s precision. This setup is very similar to the normal distributions example in the
previous section. The one diﬀerence is that the parameter θ =( εa + εi,ε a)
0 that agents
try to infer from the signal s is now two-dimensional. Apart from that, there is again a
single normal prior for θ and a set of normal likelihoods for s parametrized by σ2
s.T h e







s]. The set of posteriors about θ at date 1 is
calculated using standard rules for updating normal random variables. For ﬁxed σ2
s,l e t



















Given s, the posterior density of θ =( εa + εi,ε a)
0 is also normal. In particular, the
sum εa + εi is normal with mean γ (σ2
s)s and variance (1 − αγ (σ2
s))σ2
a +( 1− γ (σ2
s))σ2
i,
while its covariance with εa is (1 − αγ (σ2
s))σ2
a. These conditional moments will be used
below. As σ2
s ranges over [σ2
s,σ2
s], the coeﬃcient γ (σ2
s) also varies, tracing out a family
of posteriors. In other words, the ambiguous news s introduces ambiguity into beliefs
about fundamentals.
Measuring Information Quality
To compare information quality across situations, it is common to measure the infor-
mation content of a signal relative to the volatility of the parameter. For ﬁxed σ2
s,t h e
coeﬃcient γ(σ2
s) provides such a measure since it determines the fraction of prior variance
in θ that is resolved by the signal. Under ambiguity, γ = γ (¯ σ2
s) and ¯ γ = γ(σ2
s) provide
lower and upper bounds on (relative) information content, respectively. In the Bayesian
case, ¯ γ = γ, and agents know precisely how much information the signal contains. More
generally, the greater is ¯ γ−γ, the less conﬁdent they feel about the true information con-
tent. This is the new dimension of information quality introduced by ambiguous signals.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,γ continues to measure known information content - if γ increases,
everybody knows that the signal has become more reliable.
In the present asset market example, the signal s captures the sum of all intangible
information that market participants obtain during a particular trading period, such as a
day. The range ¯ γ −γ describes their conﬁdence in that information. It may diﬀer across
markets or time due to diﬀerences in information production. For example, consider the
case of a stock which suddenly becomes “hot”, that is, popular news coverage increases.
This often happens when a stock has done well in the past, for example. Increased
popular coverage will typically not increase the potential for truly valuable news: ¯ γ
remains nearly constant. However, given the new ﬂood of information, the “typical day’s
news” s will be aﬀected more by trumped up, irrelevant news items that cannot be easily
distinguished from relevant ones: γ falls. As a second example, suppose a foreign stock
is newly listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This will entice more U.S. analysts to
research this particular stock, because trading costs for their American clients have now
fallen. Again, the competence of the information providers is uncertain, especially since
the stock is foreign. It again becomes harder to know how reliable is the typical day’s
news. However, since most of the new coverage is by experts, one would now expect ¯ γ
to increase, while γ remains nearly constant.
133.2 Asymmetric Response and Price Discount
We assume that there is a representative agent who does not discount the future and cares
only about consumption at date 2. He has recursive multiple-priors utility with beliefs
as described above. We begin with a Bayesian benchmark, where the agent maximizes
expected utility and beliefs are as above with γ =¯ γ. We also allow for risk aversion:
let period utility be given by u(c)=−e−ρc, where ρ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk
aversion.
Bayesian Benchmark
It is straightforward to calculate the price of asset A at dates 0 and 1:







































Price equals the expected present value minus a risk premium that depends on risk
aversion and covariance with the market. The latter consists of two parts, the variance
of the common shock εa, and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock multiplied by 1
n,t h e
market share of the asset. As n becomes large, idiosyncratic risk is diversiﬁed away and




,t h ep r i c ea td a t e1w i l l
react to it. In addition, the risk premium will be reduced as the signal resolves some
uncertainty.
Ambiguous Signals
We now calculate prices when the signal is ambiguous. For simplicity, we assume that
the agent is risk neutral.3 Of course, he is still averse to uncertainty, since he is averse to
ambiguity. As discussed in Section 2, with recursive multiple-priors utility, actions are
evaluated under the worst-case conditional probability. We also know that the represen-
tative agent must hold all assets in equilibrium. It follows that the worst-case conditional
probability minimizes conditional mean dividends. Therefore, the price of asset A at date
1i s







m + γs if s ≥ 0
m +¯ γs if s<0.
(8)
A crucial property of ambiguous news is that the worst-case likelihood used to interpret a
signal depends on the value of the signal itself. Here the agent interprets bad news (s<0)
as very informative, whereas good news are viewed as imprecise. The price function q1 (s)
is thus a straight line with a kink at zero, the cutoﬀ point that determines what “bad
news” means. If the agent is not ambiguity averse
¡
¯ γ = γ
¢
, the price function is the same
as that for a Bayesian agent who is not risk averse (ρ =0 ).
3This approach allows us to derive transparent closed form solutions for key moments of prices and
returns. In the numerical example considered below, risk aversion is again introduced.
14At date 0, the agent knows that an ambiguous signal will arrive at date 1. His one-




s,w h e r eσ2
s is unknown. Again, the worst-case probability is used to evaluate
portfolios. Since the date 1 price is concave in the signal s, the date zero conditional
mean return is minimized by selecting the highest possible variance ¯ σ2
s.W et h u sh a v e
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The date zero price thus exhibits a discount, or ambiguity premium. This premium is
directly related to the extent of ambiguity, as measured by ¯ γ −γ. It is also increasing in
the volatility of fundamentals, including the volatility σ2
i of idiosyncratic risk. Without
ambiguity aversion, we obtain risk neutral pricing (q0 = m), exactly as in the case of no
risk aversion (ρ =0 )i n( 7 ) .
Comparison of (9) and (7) reveals two key diﬀerences between risk premia and premia
induced by ambiguous information. The ﬁrst is the role of idiosyncratic shocks for the
price of small assets. Ambiguous company-speciﬁc news not only induces a premium,
but the size of this premium depends on total (including idiosyncratic) risk. In the
Bayesian case, whether company-speciﬁc news is of low quality barely matters even ex
post. Indeed, for σ2
a =0and n l a r g e ,t h ea v e r a g ep r i c ea td a t e1e q u a l st h ep r i c ea td a t e0 ,
and both are equal to the unconditional mean dividend. Second, under ambiguity, prices
depend on the prospect of low information quality. It is intuitive that if it becomes known
today that information about asset A will be more diﬃcult to interpret in the future,t h i s
makes asset A less attractive, and hence cheaper, already today. This is exactly what
happens when the signal is ambiguous. In contrast, a change of information quality in
the Bayesian model does not have this eﬀect. While the prospect of lower information
quality in the future produces a larger discount ex post after the news has arrived (q1 is
increasing in γ), the ex ante price q0 is independent of γ.
Both properties can be traced to one behavioral feature: for ambiguity averse in-
vestors, uncertainty about the distribution of future payoﬀsi saﬁrst-order concern. We
have discussed above that the Bayesian model fails to predict behavior in the Ellsberg
experiment, because it assumes that agents treat all model uncertainty as risk. The
multiple-priors model accommodates Ellsberg-type behavior because agents act as if they
adjust the mean of the uncertain assets (or bets). The same eﬀe c ti sa tw o r kh e r e .T o
elaborate, consider ﬁrst the impact of idiosyncratic shocks. If uncertainty about mean
earnings changes because of company-speciﬁc news, then Bayesians treat this as a change
in risk. There will be only a second order eﬀect on Bayesian valuation of a company as
long as the covariance with the market remains the same. In contrast, ambiguity averse
i n v e s t o r sa c ta si fm e a ne a r n i n g st h e m s e l v e sh a v ec h a n g e d . T h i si saﬁrst-order eﬀect,
even if the company is small.
15Second, suppose that Bayesian market participants are told at date 0 that hard-to-
interpret news will arrive at date 1. They believe that, at date 1, everybody will simply
form subjective probabilities about the meaning of the signal at date 1 and average
diﬀerent scenarios to arrive at a forecast for dividends. As long as the volatility of
fundamentals does not change, total risk is the same and there is no need for prices
to change. In contrast, ambiguity averse market participants know that they will not
be conﬁdent enough to assign subjective probabilities to diﬀerent interpretations of the
signal at date 1. Instead they will demand a discount once they have seen the signal. As
a result, prices reﬂect this discount even at date 0. The prospect of ambiguous news is
thus enough to cause a drop in prices.
3.3 Asset Price Properties
To compare the predictions of the model to data, we embed the above three-period
model of news release into an inﬁnite-horizon asset pricing model. Speciﬁcally, we chain
together a sequence of short learning episodes of the sort modeled above. Agents observe
just one intangible signal about the next innovation in dividends before that innovation
is revealed and the next learning episode starts.
Assume that there is an exogenous riskless interest rate r and that the agent’s dis-
count factor is β = 1
1+r. In addition, we omit the distinction between systematic and
idiosyncratic shocks, since agents’ reaction to ambiguous signals is similar in the two
cases. The level of dividends on some asset is given by a mean-reverting process,
dt = κ¯ d +( 1− κ)dt−1 + ut, (10)
where ut is a shock and κ ∈ (0,1). The parameter κ measures the speed with which
dividends adjust back to their mean ¯ d.4
Every period, agents observe an ambiguous signal about next period’s shock:
st = ut+1 + ε
s
t,




s]. The relevant state of the world for the agent
is (st,d t).T h ec o m p o n e n t sst and dt are conditionally independent, because st provides
information only about ut+1, which in turn is independent of dt. Beliefs about st+1 are
normal with mean zero and (unknown) variance σ2
u + σ2
s,t. Beliefs about dt+1 are given
by (10) and the set of posteriors about ut+1 given st described in the previous section.
4Under these assumptions, dividends are stationary in levels, which is not realistic. However, it is
straightforward to extend the model to allow for growth. Let observed dividends be given by
ˆ dt = gt(¯ d + dt)
dt =( 1 − κ)dt−1 + ut, (11)
where g − 1 is the average growth rate, g − 1 <r . The observed stock price in the growing economy is
then b qt = gtqt. The analysis below applies to the detrended stock price qt if β is replaced by βg.
16Our goal is to derive asset pricing properties that would be observed by an econome-




s].I t i s a l s o u s e f u l t o d e ﬁne γ∗ = γ (σ∗2
s ), a measure of the true
information content of the news that arrives in a typical trading period. In addition, we
assume that the true distribution of the fundamentals u coincides with the subjective
beliefs of agents. The latter assumption distinguishes the present model from existing
approaches to asset pricing under ambiguity. Indeed, existing models are driven by ambi-
guity about fundamentals. The degree of ambiguity is then often motivated by how hard
it is to measure fundamentals. The present setup illustrates that ambiguity can matter
even if the true process of dividends is known by both the econometrician and market
participants. The point is that market participants typically have access to ambiguous
information other than past dividends that is not observed by the econometrician.
Let qt denote the stock price. In equilibrium, the price at t must be the worst-case
conditional expectation of the price plus dividend in period t +1 :






2 βEt [qt+1 + dt+1]. (12)


















where γt is a random variable that is equal to ¯ γ if st < 0 and equal to γ otherwise.5
The ﬁrst two terms reﬂect the present discounted value of dividends — without intan-
gible news, prices are determined only by the interest rate and the current dividend level.
The third term captures the response to the current ambiguous signal. As in (8), this
response is asymmetric: the distribution of γt i m p l i e st h a tb a dn e w sa r ei n c o r p o r a t e d
into prices more strongly. In addition, the strength of the reaction now depends on the
persistence of dividends: if κ is smaller, then the eﬀect of news on prices is stronger since
the information matters more for payoﬀs beyond just the next period. The fourth term
captures anticipation of future ambiguous news — it is the present discounted value of the
discount in (9). As before, it may contain compensation for asset-speciﬁcs h o c k s .
We are interested also in the behavior of excess returns. In the present setup, it is
convenient to focus on per share excess returns, deﬁned as













If there is no intangible information, we have risk neutral pricing. In this case, all γ’s are
zero and excess returns are 1+r
r+κut+1 —t h e yd e p e n do n l yo nt h es h o c kt of u n d a m e n t a l s
5Conjecture a time invariant price function of the type qt = ¯ Q + Qˆ d ˆ dt + Qsγtst. Inserting the guess
into (12) and matching undetermined coeﬃcients delivers (13).
17and are always expected to be zero. The gradual diﬀusion of information through news
implies that returns will also depend on the signals, and hence on noise.
Equity Premium and Idiosyncratic Risk
















The presence of ambiguous news induces an ambiguity premium. It is well-known that
such a premium can arise as a result of ambiguity in fundamentals. What is new here
is that it is driven by ambiguity about the quality of news. Since news is in turn driven
by fundamentals, this introduces a direct link between the volatility of fundamentals and
the ambiguity premium: E∗ [Rt+1] is increasing in σu. Ambiguous signals thus provide
a reason why idiosyncratic risk is priced. Indeed, as discussed above, it does not matter
for the order of magnitude of the eﬀect whether the news is company-speciﬁco rn o t .
Recent literature has documented a link between idiosyncratic risk and excess returns
in the cross section (for example, Lehmann [28] and Malkiel and Xu [29]). The explana-
tion typically put forward is that agents do not fully diversify. There is indeed evidence
that some agents, such as individual households, hold undiversiﬁed portfolios.6 However,
a Bayesian model will produce equilibrium premia for idiosyncratic risk only if there is
no agent who holds a well-diversiﬁed portfolio. Any well-diversiﬁed mutual fund, for
example, will bid up prices until the discount on idiosyncratic risk is zero. In contrast,
the present model features one, well-diversiﬁed, investor. As long as this investor views
company-speciﬁcn e w sa sa m b i g u o u s ,h ew i l lw a n tt ob ec o m p e n s a t e df o ri t . S i n c ei n -
stitutional investors with low transaction costs still have to process news, this delivers a
more robust story for why idiosyncratic risk can matter.
Additional implications of the ambiguous news model could be used to explore further
the trade-oﬀ between idiosyncratic shocks and expected returns. In particular, the pre-
mium changes to diﬀerent degrees depending on the way in which information quality is
increased. Other things equal, the premium is increasing in both ¯ γ and γ, but the deriv-
ative with respect to ¯ γ is always larger. This implies that, at the margin, an increase in
coverage by potential experts (higher ¯ γ) induces a larger increase in the premium than an




. The intuition is that potential high quality
news moves prices more, and hence induces more uncertainty per unit of volatility of
fundamentals σu.
Excess Volatility
A classic question in ﬁnance is why stock prices are so much more volatile than measures
of the expected present value of dividends. We now reconsider the link between “excess
6In fact, ambiguity aversion may be responsible for such underdiversiﬁcation. See Epstein and Schnei-
der [19] for an analysis of portfolio choice with recursive multiple-priors.
























Price volatility is proportional to the volatility of the shock u. When there is no intangible
information
¡
γ =¯ γ =0
¢
, the second term in the big bracket is zero, and the volatility
of prices is equal to that of the present value of dividends .
T h eb i gb r a c k e tr e ﬂects the propagation of shocks through news. In the Bayesian
case (γ =¯ γ = γ∗),i ti se q u a lt o 1
κ(2−κ) + γ∗: given persistence κ, price volatility is
increasing in information quality and bounded above. In particular, with persistent
dividends (κ small), changes in information quality typically have only a small eﬀect on
price volatility, which is dominated by the volatility of the present value of dividends.
With ambiguous signals, at the benchmark ¯ γ = γ = γ∗, var(qt) is increasing in both
¯ γ and γ. In other words, more news coverage by potential experts (higher ¯ γ) increases
volatility, while more popular coverage (lower γ) tends to reduce it. Also, the possibility
of ambiguous news removes the upper bound on price volatility imposed by the Bayesian
model.7 Ambiguous signals can thus contribute to excess volatility of prices.
Recent empirical work on ﬁrm level volatility has mostly focused on volatility of



















¯ γ − γ
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At the point ¯ γ = γ = γ∗, the derivatives of var(Rt) with respect to both ¯ γ and γ are
again positive. Changes in information quality due to changes in the ambiguity of signals
thus aﬀect the volatility of prices and returns in the same way. This is in sharp contrast
to the Bayesian case, where price and return volatilities move in opposite directions.8
As explained by West [40], the latter result obtains because higher information quality
simply means that more information about future cash ﬂo w si sr e l e a s e de a r l i e r ,w h e n
these future cash ﬂows are still being discounted at a higher rate.
Campbell et al. [12] document an upward trend in individual stock return volatility.
One question is whether this development can be connected to improvements in infor-
mation technology. Campbell et al. interpret such improvements as an increase in γ∗,
and dismiss the explanation, because return volatility should decrease, rather than in-
crease. In our framework, this argument only applies if the eﬀect of the new technology
7This does not mean that that price volatility in the ambiguous news model is arbitrary. It just says
that the model cannot be rejected using relative volatility of prices and dividends. In a quantitative
application, ¯ γ, γ and γ∗ can be identiﬁed from the full distribution of prices. See Section 4 for an
example.











so that an increase in γ∗ makes price more volatile but returns less so.
19is immediately fully known. If agents have also become less certain about how much
improvement there is, the outcome is no longer obvious. In particular, while higher γ∗
lowers return volatility, higher ¯ γ increases it. Increased uncertainty about the potential
of information technology is thus consistent with higher volatility of returns.
Negative Skewness
Since ambiguity averse market participants respond asymmetrically to news, the model
tends to produce skewed distributions for prices and returns, even though both dividends
and noise have symmetric (normal) distributions. Skewness of a random variable x is
usually deﬁned by µ3 (x)/(σ(x))
3,w h e r eµ3 is the centered third moment and σ is the
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The appendix shows that µ3 (γtst) is negative and proportional to σ3
u, where the propor-
tionality factor depends on ¯ γ, γ and γ∗.S i n c e γ∗ ≤ ¯ γ, the second term is negative, so
that returns are negatively skewed, provided that the discount factor β is high enough.
Moreover, since the standard deviation of returns is proportional to σu, skewness is in-
dependent of the volatility of fundamentals and depends only on relative information
quality. In the Bayesian case, skewness is zero.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o l l o w sf r o mt h ed e ﬁnition of returns and agents’ asymmetric response,
captured by the distribution of γt. At date t +1 , the realized return Rt+1 is aﬀected by
two pieces of news. First, the signal st+1 will be weighted more heavily the less favorable
it is, which tends to make returns negatively skewed. Second, the dividend shock ut+1
will often oﬀset strong negative responses to signals in the previous period. As a result,
the “dividend surprise” ut+1 − γtst will be positively skewed. Since the signal st+1 is
about future cash ﬂows (beyond t +1 ), the ﬁrst eﬀect becomes more important as the
discount factor increases. Indeed, for β → 1 we will always obtain negative skewness.
The dividend surprise is less positively skewed than the signal itself is negatively skewed,
because the signal does provide some information. We conclude that, at least at high
frequencies, the model predicts negative skewness in returns.
Negative skewness of stock returns at high frequencies has been widely documented
in the empirical literature. It is closely connected to the ﬁnding that volatility increases
i nt i m e so fl o wr e t u r n s ,w h i c hh a sb e e nf o u n di nb o t ha g g r e g a t e( i n d e x )a n di n d i v i d u a l
stock returns.9 In the cross section, conditional negative skewness tends to be more
pronounced in stocks that have (i) witnessed a runup in prices in the last six months and
(ii) low book-to-market value (Harvey and Siddique [26], Chen et al. [15]). This evidence
is consistent with our comparative statics analysis of information quality. Stocks that
have recently risen in price and glamour stocks with low book-to-market value all tend to
attract a lot of popular media attention. As traders grapple with intangible information
— news of uncertain quality — they induce negative skewness in returns.
9See, for example, Bekaert and Wu [5] for references.
20T h ea b o v ec i t e dp a p e r sa l s os h o wt h a tn e g a t i v es k e w n e s st e n d st ob em o r ep r o n o u n c e d
for stocks with larger market capitalization. A potential explanation is again that large
cap stocks are “in the news” more, so that traders in those stocks have to digest more
ambiguous, intangible information. It is important for this point that our model does
not predict that skewness and volatility are related in the cross section: large stocks can
be more negatively skewed, but still have lower volatility and hence ambiguity premia,
s i n c et h e i rf u n d a m e n t a l sa r em o r es t a b l e( l o w e rσ2
u). It is also important that skewness is
driven by the ambiguity of signals, and not by ambiguous prior information. One might
expect that investors perceive small stocks to be more ambiguous ex ante. Incorporating
prior ambiguity about the mean of ut, say, would increase the ambiguity premium and
could thus help to explain the size eﬀect. However, it would not change the centered
third moment and skewness. The latter would still only depend on the perception of
news.
4 SHOCKS TO INFORMATION QUALITY
The previous section compared markets with diﬀerent information quality. We now focus
on changes to information quality in a given market. In particular, asset markets often
witness shocks that not only increase uncertainty about fundamentals, but also force
markets to deal with unfamiliar news sources. Our leading example for such a shock is
September 11, 2001. On the one hand, the terrorist attack increased uncertainty about
economic growth. On the other hand, news about terrorism and foreign policy — that
were arguably less important for U.S. growth and stock returns earlier — suddenly became
important for market participants to follow. It thus became more diﬃcult for market
participants to assess how much weight to place on any given piece of news. For familiar
news, such as Fed announcements and macro statistics releases, market participants had
— through years of experience — developed a feel for the relevance of any given piece of
news. Such experience was lacking for the news that became relevant after 9/11.
We view 9/11 as the beginning of a learning process where market participants were
trying to infer the possibility of structural change to the U.S. economy from unfamiliar
signals. Figure 2 plots the price-dividend ratio for the S&P 500 index for 19 trading days,
starting 9/17, including the pre-attack value, 9/10, as day 0. The stock market was closed
in the week after the attack; trading resumed on Monday, 9/ 17. The large drop on that
day was followed by another week of losses, before the market began to rebound. At
the end of our window — Friday, October 5 — the market had climbed, for the ﬁrst time,
to the pre-attack level. It subsequently remained between 68 and 73 for another three
weeks (not shown). With hindsight, we know that structural change did not occur. The
goal is thus to explain what moved the market during the learning process, conditional
on that knowledge. We argue that the key implications of ambiguous news, asymmetric
response and price discount, help to explain the observed price pattern. The exercise
also illustrates how belief parameters can be identiﬁed from the distribution of prices.
21Setup
There is an inﬁnitely-lived representative agent. A single Lucas tree yields dividends




Y0,w i t hY0 given. According to the true data generating process,




for all t. The agent knows that the
mean growth rate is θ
hi from time 0 up to some given time T +1 . However, he believes
that with probability 1 −µ, the mean growth rate drops permanently to θ
lo after T +1 .
Information about growth beyond T +1is provided, at each date t ≤ T, by a signal st
that takes the values 1 or 0. Signals are serially independent and also independent of
dividends before T +1 ;t h e ys a t i s f yPr(st =1 )=π.A tt i m eT +1 ,t h el o n gr u nm e a n
growth rate is revealed.
The information structure captures the following scenario. First, there was no actual
permanent structural change caused by the attack.10 Second, agents were initially unsure
if there would be such a change. Third, news reports were initially much more informative
about the possibility of structural change than were dividend or consumption data. Of
course, to the extent that dividend data were available, they may have provided some
information. But initially, they are likely to have largely reﬂected decisions taken before
the attack occurred, becoming more informative only with time. Our model captures
this shift in relative informativeness in a stark way. We divide the time after the attack
i n t ot w op h a s e s ,al e a r n i n gp h a s e(t ≤ T) where dividends are entirely uninformative
about structural change, and a “new steady state” phase (t>T) where structural change
actually materializes in dividends. In our calibration below, T corresponds to 26 days.11
Finally, imposing a ﬁxed T at which θ is revealed is not a strong restriction if beliefs are
already close to the true θ at time T. We show a plot of our posterior means below.
T h ea g e n tb e l i e v e st h a ts i g n a l sa r ei n f o r m a t i v ea b o u tg r o w t h ,b u tv i e w st h e ma s









= λ ∈ [λ,λ],( 1 5 )
with λ > 1






, the single prior given by µ and the set of likelihoods L deﬁned by (15).
The special case λ = λ is a Bayesian model. To ease notation, assume that signals









In terms of the notation of Section 2, the state space is S = {0,1}×R. Since Y
is independent of s, the one-step-ahead beliefs Pt (st,Yt) for t ≤ T are given by the
appropriate product of one-step-ahead beliefs about st+1 and the conditional probability
10The model can nevertheless accommodate drops in dividends in September and stock price move-
ments that reﬂect these drops. All that is required is that such movements come from the same distrib-
ution as movements before September 11.
11The model could be extended to relax this strict division into phases. One might want to assume
that both news reports and dividends are informative about structural change at all times. However, in
such a setup, one would still like to let the informativeness of news reports decrease over time relative to
that of dividends. It is plausible that the main eﬀects of our setup would carry over to this more general
environment.




















,( 1 6 )
where β and γ are the discount factor and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, respec-
tively. Since only the signals are ambiguous, the minimization in (16) may be viewed as
a choice over sequences λ
t+1 =( λ1,...,λt+1) of precisions.
Connection between Truth and Beliefs
Discipline on beliefs is imposed in two ways. First, as above, assume that the true
precision λ lies in [λ,λ]. This condition ensures that an agent’s view of the world is not
contradicted by the data. Suppose the agent looks back at the history of signals after
he is told the true parameter at time T. If he is Bayesian (λ = λ), the distribution
o ft h es i g n a l sa tt h et r u ep a r a m e t e rv a l u ei st h es a m ea st h et r u ed i s t r i b u t i o no ft h e
signals. In this sense, the agent has interpreted the signals correctly.12 More generally,
an ambiguity averse agent contemplates many ‘theories’ of how the signal history has
been generated, each corresponding to a diﬀerent sequence of precisions. One might thus
be concerned that theories that do not satisfy λt = λ inﬁnitely often are contradicted by
the data. However, this is not the case if λ ∈ [λ,λ]: there exists a large family of signal
processes with time varying precision λt ∈ [λ,λ] that cannot be distinguished from the
true distribution on the basis of any ﬁnite sample.13 While some of these processes will
appear less likely than others in the short run, any of them is compatible with a sample
that looks i.i.d. with precision λ. An agent who believes in the whole range [λ,λ] need
not, with hindsight, feel that he interpreted the signals incorrectly.
The second way in which discipline is imposed on beliefs is through the restriction
that agents would learn the true state θ
hi even if it were not revealed at T +1 . This
precludes an excessively pessimistic interpretation of news. A suﬃcient condition is that





, converges to 1 if the truth equals the lower










=1 ,a . s . f o r st i.i.d. with Pr(st =1 )=λ.( 1 7 )
If λ were too large for given λ, agents could interpret negative signals as very precise and
never be convinced that the true state has occurred if the fraction of good signals is λ.
Thus the condition bounds λ for a given λ.
12For example, he has not been “overconﬁdent”, interpreting every signal as more precise than it
actually was.
13To construct such precision sequences, pick any ω such that ωλ +( 1− ω)λ = λ.L e t ˜ λt be an
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empirical distribution of the nonstationary signal process with precision sequence (λt) converges to the
true distribution of the signals. See Nielsen [33] for a formal proof.
23Supporting Measure and Asset Prices
Following [20], equilibrium asset prices can be read oﬀ standard Euler equations once
a (one-step-ahead) “supporting measure” that achieves the minimum in (16) has been
determined. Suppose that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than one.
It is then easy to show that continuation utility is always higher after good news (s =1 )





the supporting measure at time t and history st is chosen to minimize the probability
of a high signal in t +1 . For the past signals st, this requires maximizing the precision
of bad news (λ
∗
j = λ if sj =0 ) and minimizing the precision of good news (λ
∗
j = λ if
sj =1 ). For the future signal st+1, it requires maximizing (minimizing) the precision
λ
∗
t+1 whenever news are more likely to be bad (good) next period, that is, whenever the
posterior probability of θ
hi is smaller (larger) than 1
2.
Let qt denote the price of the Lucas tree. Since signals and dividends are independent
for t ≤ T, the price-dividend ratio vt = qt/Yt depends only on the sequence of signals. It














t denotes expectation with respect to the (one-step-ahead) supporting measure
and where the new discount factor ˆ β = βe(1−γ)θhi−1
2(1−γ)2σ2 is adjusted for dividend risk,
where γ here is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Once θ has been revealed at date
T +1 , the price dividend ratio settles at a constant value.
Calibration
We set the discount rate to 4% p.a. and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to one
half. The average growth rate of dividends is ﬁxed to match the price-dividend ratio,
yielding a number of 5.2% p.a. This is clearly larger than the historical average, which
reﬂects the high p/d ratio. The volatility of consumption is set at the historical value
of 2% p.a. reported by Campbell [11] for postwar data. Finally, we assume that the
potential permanent shock corresponds to a drop in consumption growth of .5 % p.a. In
steady state, this would correspond to a price-dividend ratio of 61.
Having ﬁxed these parameters, we infer, for every learning model, the sequence of
signals that must have generated our price-dividend ratio sample if the model is correct.
If the signals had a continuous distribution, this map would be exact. Here we assume
that agents observe 20 signals per day. We then compute the model-implied price path
that best matches the data. While the price distribution is still discrete, it is suﬃciently
ﬁne to produce sensible results. A model is discarded if its ‘pricing errors’ are larger
than .5 at any point in time. Finally, we compute the likelihood conditional on the ﬁrst
observation for each model, using the distribution of the ﬁtted price paths. This is a
useful criterion for comparing models, since the ﬁrst observation is basically explained
by the choice of the prior.












Days (Day 1 is Sep. 17, 2001)
Figure 2: Data and In-Sample Forecasts for 9/11 Calibration.
Numerical Results
To select a Bayesian model, we search over priors µ and precision parameters λ to max-
imize the likelihood. This yields an interior solution for both parameters. For example,
for precision, the intuition is as follows: the path of posteriors is completely determined
by the path of p/d ratios. Thus performance diﬀerences across Bayesian models depend
on how likely the path of posteriors is under the truth. If precision is very large, then it
is highly unlikely that there could have been enough bad news to explain the initial price
decrease. In contrast, if precision is very small, then signals are so noisy that posteriors
do not move much in response to any given news. Highly unlikely ‘clusters’ of ﬁrst bad
and then good news would be required to explain the price path. This trade-oﬀ gives
rise to an interior solution for precision.
To select a multiple-priors model, we need to specify both the true precision and the
range of precisions the agent thinks possible. To sharpen the contrast with Bayesian
models, we focus on models where ambiguity is large; we set λ slightly (.001)b e l o w
the upper bound associated with the requirement (17). We also assume that the truth
corresponds to λ.14 With these two conventions, we search over λ to ﬁnd our favorite
multiple-priors model. This model is compared to the Bayesian model in Figures 2 and
3. The favorite multiple-priors model begins with a much higher prior probability, and
14Strictly speaking, this polar case is not permitted by the restriction that the truth lie in the interior
of the precision range. However, there is always an admissible model arbitrarily close to the model we
compute.
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Days (Day 1 is Sep. 17, 2001)
Figure 3: Conditional Probabilities and Posterior Mean for 9/11 Calibration.
the precision range for λ ∈ [.58,.608] is higher than the precision for the best Bayesian
model, λ = .56. The multiple-priors model (log likelihood = −33.29)o u t p e r f o r m st h e
Bayesian model (log likelihood = −36.82). Figure 2 plots the one-step-ahead conditional
likelihoods to illustrate the source of the diﬀerence. The multiple-priors model is better
able to explain the downturn in the week of September 17. The models do about the
same during the recovery. Figure 2 plots, together with the data, three-trading-day-ahead
in-sample forecasts. This shows that the Bayesian model predicts a much faster recovery
than the multiple-priors model throughout the sample.
T h er e s u l ts h o w sh o wt h ee ﬀects discussed in the previous section operate in a setting
with many signals. The two models represent two very diﬀerent accounts of market
movements in September 2001. According to the Bayesian story, all price movements
reﬂect changes in beliefs about future growth. In particular, the initial drop in prices
arose because market participants expected a permanent drop in consumption of .2%
(see Figure 3). During the ﬁrst week, bad news increased the expected drop to almost
.5%. In contrast, the ambiguity story says that agents begin with a prior opinion that
basically nothing has changed. However, they know that the next few weeks will be one
of increased confusion and uncertainty. Anticipation of this lowers their willingness to
pay for stocks. In particular, they know that future bad news will be interpreted (by
future ambiguity averse market participants) as very precise, whereas future good news
will be interpreted as noisy. This makes it more likely that the market will drop further
in the short run than for the Bayesian model.
26For representative agent asset pricing models with multiple-priors utility, there is
always an observationally equivalent Bayesian model that yields the same equilibrium
price. This begs the questions why one should not consider this Bayesian model directly.15
Here, the reason is that this Bayesian model cannot be motivated by the same plausible
ap r i o r iview of the environment as our ambiguity aversion model. We want to capture
a scenario where signals are generated by a memoryless mechanism, and where precision
does not depend on the state of the world: learning in good times is not expected to
occur at a diﬀerent speed than in bad times. An ambiguity aversion model with these
features outperforms a Bayesian model with these features. Some other Bayesian model
which does not have these features is not of interest. In addition, such a model would
yield misleading comparative static predictions. The observationally equivalent model is
much like a ‘reduced form’ which is not invariant to changes in the environment.
5 RELATED LITERATURE
As mentioned above, our paper [17] provides axiomatic foundations for recursive multiple-
priors utility and derives measure-by-measure Bayesian updating as a dynamically con-
sistent updating rule for sets of priors. In Epstein and Schneider [19], we impose further
structure on belief sets in order to capture learning from a sequence of conditionally
independent signals. That paper introduces the general notion of “ambiguous signals”;
formally, they are signals for which connection to the underlying parameter is described
by a nonsingleton set of likelihoods. In the present paper, “ambiguous information”
refers to ambiguous signals for which likelihoods diﬀer only in precision, corresponding
to information that is hard to interpret in the sense that its reliability is uncertain. The
applications in the present paper also diﬀer from that in [19]. The latter considers partial
equilibrium portfolio choice behavior, while here our focus is on equilibrium pricing of
securities.
Several papers have derived and discussed the emergence of ambiguity premia in
general settings (for example, Epstein and Wang [20], Chen and Epstein [14]). What
is new in the present paper is that the premium is due to ambiguity in signals. This
additional structure (i) clariﬁes that the anticipation of ambiguous news is suﬃcient for
premia and (ii) creates a direct link between the size of the premium and the measured
volatility of fundamentals. In addition, we emphasize that the size of the ambiguity
premium need not have anything to do with the asset’s covariance with the market, as
long as the latter is not zero. Uncertainty about asset-speciﬁc news cannot be dismissed as
negligible because ambiguity averse agents do not diversify it away. This result is related
to the fact that the law of large numbers needs to be modiﬁed under ambiguity (see, for
example, Marinacci [31]). With ambiguous signals, it naturally leads to compensation
for measured idiosyncratic volatility.
15This model would be an expected utility model with pessimistic beliefs, similar to that in Abel [1].
27The relevance of information not observed by the econometrician has long been recog-
nized. Traditional Euler equation tests (for example, Hansen and Singleton [25]) are
attractive precisely because they are robust to agents having more information than the
econometrician. However, fully speciﬁed equilibrium asset pricing models typically as-
sume that all information is tangible — information sets tend to include only past and
present prices, consumption and dividends. An exception is Veronesi [39], who has ex-
amined the eﬀect of information quality on the equity premium in a Lucas asset pricing
model that also features an intangible (butu n a m b i g u o u s )s i g n a l . H es h o w st h a tw i t h
high risk aversion there is no premium for low information quality in a Bayesian model.
Several recent papers have pointed to overconﬁdence as a source of overreaction to
signals and excess volatility (see, for example, Daniel et al. [16], and also the references
in Barberis and Thaler [4]). In these models, the agent’s perceived precision of an in-
tangible (private) signal is higher than “true” precision. This makes reactions to signals
more aggressive than under rational expectations. The mechanism that leads to excess
volatility is thus similar to that in our model. However, overconﬁdence by itself does
not entail an asymmetric response to news. Moreover, overconﬁdence is an assumption
about the relationship between true and subjective precisions while ambiguity aversion
is an assumption about (subjective) preferences only. The two concepts are thus comple-
mentary: one can consider a model in which agents are uncertain about precision, but
the true precision lies close to (or even below) the lower bound of the range. This would
describe overconﬁdent, ambiguity averse agents.
Other recent work in behavioral ﬁnance is also motivated by psychological evidence
and explores the eﬀect of deviations from expected utility for asset pricing. Caplin and
Leahy [13] have studied a model of utility over belief states to formalize anxiety as an
anticipatory emotion. As in our model, information ﬂow in the future matters for current
utility, which is consistent with experiments on anxiety. In a series of papers, Barberis
and Huang (for example, [2], [3]) have looked at the eﬀects of narrow framing. They
assume that agents derive utility directly from individual asset positions. This gives rise
to premia on individual assets that are unrelated to correlation with the market. Our
results show that a concern for both future information ﬂow and asset-speciﬁcu n c e r t a i n t y
also follow from the ﬁrst-order concern with uncertainty exhibited by ambiguity averse
agents.
A large literature on asset pricing with Bayesian learning argues that learning can
explain excess volatility and in-sample predictability of returns. Excess volatility arises
because agents’ subjective variance of dividends is higher than the true variance. Agents
with such diﬀuse priors react more strongly to news than agents with rational expecta-
tions. To keep priors diﬀuse, the learning process is usually reset periodically, for example
because of regime shifts.16 The model of Section 3.3 is related to this literature since it
also chains together a sequence of short learning processes: in fact, agents observe just
one intangible signal about the next innovation in dividends before that innovation is
16See Timmermann [35, 36], Bossaerts [6], and Lewellen and Shanken [30] for models of nonstationary
transitions and Brandt, Xeng, and Zhang [7], Veronesi [38] and Brennan and Xia [9] for models with
persistent hidden state variables.
28revealed and the next “learning process” starts. However, a crucial diﬀerence is that
in our model the sequence of priors about dividends is equal to their true distribution.
Excess volatility therefore is not due to a high subjective variance of fundamentals. This
feature is important — it implies that our model applies when the distribution of (tangi-
ble) fundamentals is well understood. The only deviation from rational expectations in
our setup is the presence of ambiguous intangible signals.
The model of 9/11 in Section 4 focuses on a learning process triggered by an event
that increases uncertainty. It is thus closer to a second group of papers that tries to
explain post-event abnormal returns (“underreaction”) through the gradual incorporation
of information into prices.17 It may be viewed as a model of negative underreaction in
periods of ambiguous news. In these periods, underreaction is likely even if there is
no change in fundamentals that is gradually revealed. Moreover, the slide in prices is
reversed in the long run as agents learn that fundamentals have not changed.
The mechanism that generates negative skewness in our model diﬀers from existing
explanations. Veronesi [38] shows, in a Bayesian model with risk averse agents, that
prices respond more to bad news in good times and conversely. This obtains because,
in his setup, news that contradict the current belief increase the conditional variance of
asset payoﬀs. Our result diﬀers in two ways. First, since it does not rely on risk aversion,
it is relevant also if uncertainty is idiosyncratic and investors are well diversiﬁed. Second,
ambiguous signals entail an asymmetric response whether or not times are good. They
thus induce unconditional negative skewness in returns. To explain the latter fact, Hong
and Stein [27] and Veldkamp [37] have proposed mechanisms for bad news to be more
clustered. Such mechanisms could reinforce skewness in our setting, but they are not
necessary for it to obtain. In terms of cross-sectional implications, our model predicts
that the relative importance of intangible information generates skewness. As discussed
in Section 3, this is consistent with existing evidence on the cross section of stocks in the
U.S.
17See, Brav and Heaton [8] for an overview and discussion of this literature.
296 Appendix
The key step in calculating moments of prices and returns in Section 3.3 is to ﬁnd
moments of γtst,w h e r eγt denotes the random variable that is equal to ¯ γ when st ≤ 0,
and equal to γ otherwise. We summarize the properties of γtst here. All moments are
calculated under the true signal distribution. Since E [st|γt =¯ γ]=Et [st|st ≤ 0]),t h e
calculations make heavy use of formulas for moments of truncated normal distributions,




t|st ≥ 0] = σ2 and E [s3
t|st ≥ 0] = σ3
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To determine the variance of returns, we also need the term
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where the second equality follow from algebra and the third moment of the truncated
























u/γ∗, this expression is indeed proportional to σ2
u,w h e r et h ef a c t o ro f
proportionality depends only on ¯ γ, γ and γ∗.
Finally, consider the third centered moment of returns. Since ut+1−γtst and γt+1st+1
are independent, we just need to compute
µ3 (ut+1 − γtst)=µ3 (ut+1) − µ3 (γtst)
+3E
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The ﬁrst term is zero since since ut+1 is normal. In the third and fourth terms, use
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u/γ∗, we obtain the expression in the text.
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